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INTRODUCTION
Isolated wetlands-wetlands that do not have a hydrological surface
connection to another body of water and are not adjacent1 to an
interstate or navigable body of water 2-have been the center of much
recent controversy. First, the House of Representatives passed a bill'
("House Bill 961") to amend the Clean Water Act4 that drastically
would have reduced federal protection of isolated wetlands.5 Second,
a Supreme Court decision6 establishing limits on congressional
1. "Adjacent" means "bordering, contiguous, or neighboring." 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (1995).
2. The Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") defines isolated waters as "those non-tidal
waters of the United States that are: (1) Not part of a surface tributary system to interstate or
navigable waters of the United States; and (2) Not adjacent to such tributary waterbodies." Id.
§ 330.2(e).
3. H.R. 961, 104th Cong. (1995). H.R. 961 attempts to rank wetlands in three categories
based on ecological value. See id. Category A wetlands would receive the highest amount of
protection provided that landowners were compensated by the federal government. See id.
Wetlands in category B would receive an intermediate level of protection, less than what is
provided under current law. See id. Category C wetlands would receive no protection under
federal law. See id.
Many scientists have criticized H.R. 961 as scientifically unsound. See, e.g.,John H. Cushman,
Jr., Scientists Reject Criteria for Wetlands Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1995, at D19 [hereinafter
Cushman, Criteria for Wetlands] (reporting that William M. Lewis, Jr., Chairman, National
Academy of Science's Wetlands Committee, called bill's ranking of wetlands "arbitrary"); John
H. Cushman,Jr., House and Science Panels Clash on Wetlands'Fate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,1995, atA30
(quoting wetlands biologist Joy B. Zedler as saying, "I don't see the use of science in the
preparation of this [bill]."); Richard Stone, Wetlands Reform Bill is All Wet, Say Scientists, 268
SCIENCE 970, 970 (1995) (finding that H.R. 961 failed to take scientific research into
consideration); Michael Terrazas, HR 961 Limits Federal Wetland Protection, AM. CrIy & COUNTRY,
July 1995, at 20 (stating that House of Representatives failed to consider available scientific
information in passing bill); Wetlands Provisions in CWA Legislation Lack Scientific Basis, Research
Council Says, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 177, 183 (1995) (reporting that National Research Council's
Committee on Wetlands Characterization determined that H.R. 961's classification scheme
lacked scientific justification).
4. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994).
5. SeeEditorial, Bud Shuster's Dirty Water Act N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1995, D14 (charging that
H.R. 961 "would reverse a 25-year effort to preserve diminishing wetlands"); see also Water
Pollution: Over 20 Percent of Major Permittees in Serious Violation of CWA, Group Says, NAT'L ENv'T
DAILY (BNA),June 23, 1995 at D12 (observing that although Clean Water Act is being violated
by many nonpermitted discharges, House of Representatives has taken actions to weaken law
rather than to strengthen it). If this bill had been adopted as law, it was estimated that 50 to
80% of the United States' wetlands currently regulated by federal law would have lost federal
protection. See Terrazas, supra note 3, at 20 (observing that decreasing federal protection of
wetlands will go against "no net loss" wetland policy adopted by Bush and Clinton administra-
tions).
H.R. 961 expired at the conclusion of the congressional session without having been passed
by the Senate.
6. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (overturning federal law
banning possession of firearms in school zones because Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause
authority).
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Commerce Clause authority is a likely impetus for an increase in
isolated wetlands litigation.7
The federal regulation of isolated wetlands sometimes prevents
individuals from undertaking economically advantageous activities on
private land.' Generally, opponents of such regulation argue that
federal oversight of isolated wetlands located entirely within a state's
boundaries exceeds the reach of the Commerce Clause because there
is not a sufficient nexus between isolated wetlands and interstate
commerce.' This argument rests on the fact that isolated wetlands
have no surface connection to any navigable body of water.10
Proponents of federal regulation of isolated wetlands, on the other
hand, look beyond hydrological connections to the ecological
functions of these wetlands in order to establish a connection to
interstate commerce."
Isolated wetland regulation is predicated primarily on the use or
potential use of the isolated wetland as a migratory bird habitat. 2
Courts have held that this rationale for regulation is within the scope
of Congress' commerce power." House Bill 961, however, expressly
prohibited protection of isolated wetlands based on use or potential
use by migratory birds as a habitat. 4 If the Senate had passed
7. See Mark A. Chertok, Federal Regulation of Wetlands, C127 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY
1131, 1144 n.58 (1995) ("The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Lop... may
presage further litigation challenging jurisdiction over 'isolated' wetlands.").
8. See Cushman, Criteia for Wetlands, supra note 3, at D19 (attributing debate of isolated
wetlands regulations to "giant economic stakes involved in their development").
9. See High Court Refuses to Review Question of Whether Isolated Wetlands Regulated, 26 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1163, 1163 (1995) (reporting that petitioner argued "that Congress lacked the
power under the U.S. Constitution to bring isolated water bodies within the sweep of the Clean
Water Act's wetlands regulations"). A recent petition to the Supreme Court regarding the
regulation of isolated wetlands argued that Congress did not have authority under the
Constitution to extend the Clean Water Act to isolated wetlands. See id.
10. "It is undisputed that the [isolated wetlands] at issue in this case have never been, are
not now, and probably will never be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce."
Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 407, 407-09 (1995) (Thomas,J., dissenting) (explaining
reason for his dissent from Supreme Court's denial of certiorari), denying cert. to Leslie Salt Co.
v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995).
11. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, infra note 72, at 59, 156 (advocating "ecosystem
concept" in regulating wetlands); see also Leslie Salt Co., 55 F.3d at 1395 (finding Corps' rationale
for regulating adjacent wetlands applicable to regulation of isolated wetlands). Although
isolated wetlands may have "no hydrologic connection to any other body of water," id. at 1394,
"'they may serve significant natural biological functions, including food chain production,
general habitat, and nesting, spawning, rearing, and resting sites for aquatic ... species.'" Id.
at 1395 (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 134-35 (1985)).
12. This practice is known as the migratory bird rule. For a discussion of this rule, see infra
notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 79 and accompanying text (listing cases in which migratory bird rule was
upheld).
14. See H.R. 961, 104th Cong. (1995); see also Stone, supra note 3, at 970 (explaining how
H.R. 961 eliminates protection of isolated wetlands by proscribing use of migratory bird rule).
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House Bill 961, the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") and the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") could have lost their
jurisdiction over these wetlands unless courts recognized other
functions of isolated wetlands that implicate interstate commerce.
15
A recent Supreme Court case, United States v. Lopez,' 6 also could
impede the Corps' and the EPA's regulatory jurisdiction over isolated
wetlands. According to Lopez, the federally regulated activity must
have a substantial connection to interstate commerce for a con-
gressional exercise of Commerce Clause authority to be upheld.
1 7
Although the case concerned a federal criminal regulation and not an
environmental protection statute, the Commerce Clause analysis that
the Court adopted in Lopez could be applied to any law passed under
Congress' commerce power, including the Clean Water Act.'8
Some environmental protection statutes already have been singled
out as possible targets for Commerce Clause challenges based on
United States v. Lopez.'9 In particular, regulations concerning the
discharge of fill and dredged materials onto isolated wetlands" are
likely to be contested on the ground that the activity does not have
a substantial effect on interstate commerce.2' Although many
circuits already have upheld the constitutionality of federal
regulation of isolated wetlands,22 courts have not yet applied the
15. See H.R. 961, 104th Cong. § 404.
16. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
17. SeeJoan Biskupic, Court Signals Sharp Shift on Congressional Powers, WASH. POsT, Apr. 28,
1995, at A3 (finding that Court's decision in Lopez brings into question federal environmental
regulations directed at local activities, such as regulation of wetlands).
18. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995).
19. See Water Pollution: Isolated Waters Do Not Affect Interstate Commerce, Not Covered by Water
Act, Petition Argues, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 617, 625 (1995) [hereinafter WaterPollution] (reporting
that petition for certiorari to Supreme Court in Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 407
(1995), argues that isolated wetlands do not affect interstate commerce under Lopez analysis).
William C. Banks, a Syracuse University law professor, predicted that Lope will call into question
.a whole body of federal criminal law, federal environmental law, (and] social policies."
Biskupic, supra note 17, at A3.
20. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
21. See Water Pollution, supra note 19, at 625.
22. See, e.g., Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming
that "'[t]he commerce clause power, and thus the Clean Water Act, is broad enough to extend
the Corps' jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and
endangered species."' (quoting Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.
1990))); Rueth v. EPA, 13 F.3d 227, 261 (7th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that interstate commerce
is affected by wetlands used by migratory birds); Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256 (7th
Cir. 1993) (identifying migratory birds as nexus between interstate commerce and isolated
wetlands); United States v. Sargent County Water Resource Dist., 876 F. Supp. 1081, 1087
(D.N.D. 1992) (holding that isolated wetlands are within jurisdiction of Clean Water Act when
important to migratory birds). But see Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 726, 728-
29 (E.D. Va. 1989) (holding that Corps does not have authority to regulate isolated wetlands on
the ground that they are used or possibly used by migratory birds because rule is not in accord
with Administrative Procedure Act); infra note 78 (discussing Tabb Lakes).
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Commerce Clause analysis set forth in Lopez to isolated wetlands
regulation.
In light of the Lopez decision, this Comment relies on scientific
evidence to establish that the destruction of isolated wetlands has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. Part I summarizes the
regulation of isolated wetlands under the Clean Water Act. Part II
examines court decisions addressing Commerce Clause challenges to
isolated wetlands regulation. After a brief review of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence in Part III, Part IV of this Comment considers the
Commerce Clause analysis set forth by the majority of the Court in
Lopez. Finally, Part V explores the repercussion of Lopez on future
Commerce Clause challenges to isolated wetlands regulations. This
Comment ultimately recommends that the ecological functions of
isolated wetlands and their connections to other ecosystems should be
considered when determining whether there is a substantial nexus
between isolated wetlands and interstate commerce.
I. THE CLEAN WATER AcT
A. Defining "Navigable Waters"
Congress enacted the Clean Water Act2 pursuant to its Com-
merce Clause authority. 4 The primary purpose of the Act is to
"restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the Nation's waters."' A secondary goal of the Clean Water Act
is to achieve a level of water quality that serves to protect and
encourage the propagation of fish and wildlife.2" Although the
Clean Water Act does not explicitly mention wetlands, legislative
history indicates that Congress included section 404 of the Act to
regulate wetlands. Section 404 requires a permit for the "discharge
of dredged or fill material into navigable waters."2" "Navigable
waters" are broadly defined as "waters of the United States.
29
23. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
24. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress power "to regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
25. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
26. Seeid. at§ 1251(a)(2).
27. See S. REP. No. 95-370, at 10 (1977) ("There is no question that the systematic
destruction of the Nation's wetlands is causing serious, permanent ecological damage .... The
unregulated destruction of these areas is a matter which needs to be corrected and which
implementation of section 404 has attempted to achieve."), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326,
4336.
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
29. i& § 1362(7).
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Initially, the Corps narrowly construed the Act's definition of
"navigable waters.""0  The Corps' interpretation, however, was
challenged successfully by environmental groups who asserted that
Congress intended a broad definition of "navigable waters."" As a
result, the Corps was ordered to issue regulations "recognizing the full
regulatory mandate" of the Clean Water Act.
32
Both the EPA and the Corps subsequently interpreted "waters of
the United States" to include wetlands.3 Congress acquiesced to this
interpretation when it amended the Clean Water Act in 1977.s4
Currently, section 404 of the Clean Water Act extends to any isolated
wetlands "which could affect interstate or foreign commerce" if
destroyed or degraded.'5
B. The Scope of Federal Regulation of Isolated Wetlands
and the Permit Process
It is important to maintain perspective about the scope of feder-
al regulation of isolated wetlands. Not every isolated wetland is
subject to regulation, 6 and many activities are exempted by section
30. See 39 Fed. Reg. 12,119 (1974) (defining navigable waters as "those waters of the United
States which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, and/or are presently, or in the future
susceptible for use for purposes of interstate or foreign commerce").
31. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Calloway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C.
1975) (holding that Corps' definition was not in accord with statutory definition that intended
navigable waters to be defined "to the maximum extent permissible under the Commerce
Clause"). The case was brought by the NRDC and the National Wildlife Federation. See also
118 CONG. REc. S33,692, 33,699 (1972) (statement of Sen. Muskie) ("The confereees fully
intend that the term 'navigable waters' be given the broadest possible constitutional
interpretation .... ").
32. See Natural Resources Defense Counci, 392 F. Supp. at 686.
33. The EPA and the Corps both define "waters of the United States," in pertinent part, as:
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or may be
susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent
streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa
lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect
interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational
or other purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in interstate or
foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purposes by industries in
interstate commerce ....
33 C.F.RI § 328.3(a) (1995) (Corps' definition); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (1995) (EPA's definition).
34. SeeS. REP. No. 95-370, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326,4336 (asserting
that § 404 is intended to be implemented to protect wetlands).
35. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (3) (Corps' definition); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (3) (EPA's
definition).
36. See infra notes 44-45.
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404.17 Individuals must obtain a permit before discharging
dredged' or fill 9 material into a wetland; ° yet, permits are not
required under section 404 for other activities, such as draining, that
also destroy isolated wetlands.41 Furthermore, section 404 exempts
from regulation many activities that involve the discharge of fill or
dredged materials.' Many farming, ranching, and timber harvesting
activities, for example, do not require a permit for discharging fill or
dredged materials into wetlands.43  In addition, individual permits
are not required for small isolated wetlands.' Finally, the Corps
regulates only those isolated wetlands with a substantial connection to
interstate commerce. 45
Typically, the permit process is initiated by an individual who wants
to discharge fill or dredged material into a wetland to convert it from
an aquatic to a terrestrial environment for development purposes. 6
An application for a permit must be submitted to the Corps, the
agency responsible for issuing permits under section 404.4' When
37. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) (1) (1994) (exempting discharge of fill material for normal
farming, maintenance, construction, or approved state purposes from prohibitions of Act).
38. "Dredged material" is defined as "material that is excavated or dredged from the waters
of the United States." 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (Corps' definition); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2(g) (5) (ii) (EPA's
definition).
39. The Corps defines "fill material" as "material used for the primary purpose of replacing
an aquatic area with dry land or of changing the bottom elevation of a waterbody." 33 C.F.R.
§ 323.2(e). The EPA defines "fill material" as "any 'pollutant' which replaces portions of the
'waters of the United States' with dry land or which changes the bottom elevation of a water
body for any purpose." 40 C.F.L § 232.20).
40. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
41. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act does not regulate the draining of wetlands. See33
U.S.C. § 1344 (1994). A CITIZENS' GUIDE TO PROTECTING WETLANDS recognizes a substantial
hole in wetlands regulation under section 404: "Unless activities such as draining, dredging,
excavating, flooding, and contamination of wetlands actually involve some discharge of dredged
or fill material, they are not regulated under section 404." NATIONAL WILDLIFE FED'N, A
CITzENs' GUIDE TO WETLANDS 13 (1989).
42. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f).
43. Seeid.§ 1344(f)(1)(A).
44. See 33 C.F.R. pt. 330 app. A(26) (exempting from regulation discharges causing loss of
less than 10 acres of isolated wetlands).
45. See id. § 328.3 (a) (3) (defining "waters of the United States" as waters which "the use,
degradation or destruction of... could affect interstate or foreign commerce"). Dredging and
filling activities affecting less than one acre of isolated wetlands rarely are regulated by the
Corps. See id. pt. 330 app. A(26) (a)-(b). In addition, activities affecting less than 10 acres are
eligible for a "nationwide permit 26 a general permit that streamlines the administrative process
by allowing dredge and fill activity on such a small scale without requiring individual review of
the application." Id.
46. See generallyJon Kusler, Wetlands Delineation: An Issue of Science or Politics?, 34 ENV'T 7,
9 (1992) (charting permit process); WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, STATEWIDE WETLANDS STRATEGIES:
A GUIDE TO MANAGING THE RESOURCE 75-78 (1992) (providing overview of § 404 permit
process).
47. See33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). The Corps receives 15,000 section 404 permit applications each
year. See WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, supra note 46, at 76.
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considering a permit application,' the Corps follows the guidelines
it established jointly with the EPA.49 Each application must undergo
a public interest review and meet a public notice requirement"
before the Corps can issue a permit.51
The EPA also reviews section 404 permit applications 2 and is
authorized to exempt an activity from the permit requirement if
section 404 does not prohibit the proposed discharge. 3 In addition,
the EPA has authority to veto any permit application if the proposed
discharge would adversely affect water supplies, wildlife, or recreation-
al areas.54
With respect to isolated wetlands, the scope of the EPA's and the
Corps' jurisdiction under section 404 has been the subject of
considerable litigation. Courts generally have upheld regulations
promulgated by the EPA and the Corps' that pertain to isolated
wetlands.56 Furthermore, courts have found the use or possible use
of isolated wetlands by migratory birds, as either a habitat or breeding
ground, to be a sufficient connection to interstate commerce.
5 7
II. COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGES TO REGULATING
ISOLATED WETLANDS
A. The Supreme Court's Reasoning in United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc. Is Applicable to Isolated Wetlands
The Supreme Court thus far has avoided deciding whether the
regulation of isolated wetlands is within the scope of the Commerce
48. "[E]ach such disposal site shall be specified for each such permit by the Secretary [of
the Army) (1) through the application of guidelines developed by the Administrator [of the
EPA], in conjunction with the Secretary [of the Army] .... " 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (1).
49. See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b) (4); 40 C.F.R. § 230.10 (1995).
50. See 33 C.F.I. § 320.4 (stating that factors such as economics, water quality, environmen-
tal concerns, flood hazards, and property ownership must be considered during the public
interest review); id. § 325.3 (providing public notice regulations).
51. "The Secretary may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public hearings for
the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites."
33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
52. See id § 1344(c); see also 40 C.F.R. § 231.1 (detailing procedure by which EPA may
prohibit specification of any area as disposal site for dredged or fill material).
53. See33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) (listing discharges that are exempt from § 404 permit process);
see also 33 C.F.R. § 323.4 (Corps' regulations); 40 C.F.R. § 232.3 (EPA's regulations).
54. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (authorizing EPA to veto discharge that would have "an
unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas
(including spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas").
55. See infra notes 73-87 and accompanying text (discussing litigation over isolated wetlands
regulations).
56. See supra note 22 (listing cases upholding federal regulation of isolated wetlands).
57. See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text (explaining link between migratory birds
and interstate commerce).
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Clause.5" In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 9 however,
the Court considered whether the Clean Water Act authorized the
Corps to require section 404 permits for discharging fill material into
adjacent wetlands.6' Although this case is not dispositive of the
isolated wetlands issue, much of the Court's reasoning is relevant
because adjacent and isolated wetlands perform many of the same
ecological functions.6
In Riverside, the Court stated two reasons for upholding the Corps'
regulatory authority over adjacent wetlands. First, the Court found
that the Corps' jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands was reasonable
because, in order to protect aquatic ecosystems, Congress broadly
defined "waters" covered by the Clean Water Act.62 Furthermore,
the Court interpreted Congress' refusal to exclude adjacent wetlands
from the definition of "waters" as an acquiescence to the Corps'
inclusion of adjacent wetlands in the definition of "waters" under the
Act.63 Second, the Court agreed with the Corps' conclusion that
adjacent wetlands play an important role in "protecting and enhanc-
58. See Cargill v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 407 (1995) (denying certiorari to petition
challenging regulation of isolated wetlands on Commerce Clause grounds); United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 n.8 (1985) (limiting Commerce Clause
discussion to wetlands adjacent to bodies of water, not including isolated wetlands).
59. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
60. See Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 123 (questioning whether Clean Water Act and
related regulations "authorize[] the Corps to require landowners to obtain permits from the
Corps before discharging fill material into wetlands adjacent to navigable bodies of water and
their tributaries"); see also Kenneth L. Rosenbaum, The Supreme Court Endorses a Broad Reading of
Corps Wetland Jurisdiction UnderFWPCA § 404, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,008, 10,012
(1986) (surmising that Court's reasoning in Riverside Bayview Homes suggests that isolated
wetlands are protected under § 404 because hydrological and ecological connection of isolated
wetlands are essential to water quality and aquatic ecosystems).
61. See Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 131 n.8. Although the Supreme Court did not
consider whether the application of section 404 to isolated wetlands is constitutional, much of
the Court's reasoning regarding adjacent wetlands is applicable to isolated wetlands. See infra
Part V.B (discussing how isolated wetlands perform many of same functions as adjacent
wetlands).
62. See Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 133 (observing that Congress exercised its power
under the Commerce Clause with the intention that the Clean Water Act would extend beyond
waters traditionally recognized as "navigable" (citing S. CONF. REP. No. 92-1236, at 144 (1972);
118 CONG. Rac. H33,756-757 (1972) (statement of Rep. Dingell)).
63. Although there was some congressional debate over restricting the scope of waters
covered by the Clean Water Act when the Act was reauthorized in 1977, Congress decided not
to restrict the scope for fear of diminishing the protection of wetlands. See Riverside Bayview
Homes, 474 U.S. at 137-38 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-139, at 24 (1977)). Furthermore, even those
members of Congress who favored narrowing the scope of waters protected by the Act still would
have included adjacent wetlands as waters covered by the Act. See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-
139, at 24 (1977)). It is noteworthy that "Congress has never indicated that it intended to
differentiate among types of wetlands in § 404's coverage." JerryJackson & Sarah V. Armitage,
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes: A QuestionableInterpretation of§ 404, 14 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,366, 10,372 (1984).
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ing water quality."64 Even though not all adjacent wetlands signifi-
cantly affect water quality, the Court determined that the Corps'
inclusion of adjacent wetlands in the definition of "waters" subject to
regulation was reasonable.65 In sum, given Congress' desire for a
broad interpretation of "waters" to be protected by the Clean Water
Act and the ecological functions that adjacent wetlands serve, the
Supreme Court held that adjacent wetlands were within the scope of
"waters" protected by the Act.
66
Like adjacent wetlands, scientific evidence suggests that isolated
wetlands can have widespread economic and ecological effects,
67
thereby substantially affecting interstate commerce. These wetlands
perform commercial functions including controlling floods and
filtering pollutants from water.' Although isolated wetlands, by
definition, are not linked on the surface with any other body of water,
subsurface connections often exist.69 Thus, the benefits of isolated
wetlands affect water sources and communities that may not appear
to be directly connected to them. Isolated wetlands also serve
important ecological functions, such as providing migratory birds with
food, habitat, breeding, and resting areas.70  Because isolated
wetlands have many of the same attributes as adjacent wetlands, which
the Supreme Court has held to be within the Corps' regulatory
jurisdiction,7' there is little justification for legislation and judicial
decisions that hold isolated wetlands as less significant than adjacent
wetlands.
72
64. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 133-34 (finding Corps' conclusion that adjacent
wetlands are covered by Clean Water Act was not unreasonable because these areas filter and
purify water, prevent erosion and flooding, and serve as breeding and habitat areas for species).
65. See id. at 135 n.9. It should be noted, however, that not all adjacent wetlands
significantly affect water quality.
66. See id. at 139.
67. See infra Part V.B. (discussing ecological and economic benefits that isolated wetlands
provide).
68. See infra notes 198-217 and accompanying text (discussing commercial functions of
isolated wetlands).
69. See infra note 186 and accompanying text (noting that subsurface connection between
isolated wetlands and ground water enables isolated wetlands to serve ecological functions such
as maintaining water quality).
70. See infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text (explaining ecological role isolated
wetlands have in promoting migratory bird species and biodiversity).
71. See Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 134-35 (holding that Corps has statutory
authority to regulate adjacent wetlands under Clean Water Act).
72. See NATIONAL RESEARcH COUNCIL, WETLANDs: CHARAcTERISTICS AND BOUNDARIES 156,
166-67 (1995).
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B. The Migratory Bird Rule
The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in Cargill v. United
States,3 a case directly challenging the constitutionality of regulating
the filling of isolated wetlands on private land.74 The Ninth Circuit,
which originally heard the case under the name Leslie Salt Co. v. United
States,75 held that the presence of migratory birds and endangered
species on the property provided a sufficient nexus between the
regulated activity and interstate commerce. 6 Nevertheless, the court
recognized the connection as "certainly test[ing] the limits of
Congress' commerce powers and, some would argue, the bounds of
reason."
77
In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit relied on the Corps'
declaration that the Clean Water Act covers waters "which are or
would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird Treaties
... or... by other migratory birds which cross state lines."' This
statement is the basis for the "migratory bird rule," a test courts apply
to determine whether an isolated wetland may be federally regulated
under the Clean Water Act. 9 The migratory bird rule is based on
73. 116 S. Ct. 407, denying cert. to Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir.
1995).
74. See Leslie Salt Co., 55 F.3d at 1391.
75. 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995), ajfg 820 F. Supp. 478 (N.D. Cal. 1992), cert. denied sub
nom. Cargill v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 407 (1995).
76. See id. at 1396 (finding that lower court's holding was not erroneous "given the broad
sweep of the Commerce Clause"), afflg 820 F. Supp. 478 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
77. Id.; see also Rueth v. EPA, 13 F.3d 227,231 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting breadth of migratory
bird rule in that it brings most isolated wetlands within reach of CWA); Hoffman Homes, Inc.
v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256, 263 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that isolated wetland may not be regulated
by EPA because there was not substantial evidence that isolated wetland was suitable as potential
habitat for migratory birds).
78. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (1986). At least one court has held that the Corps has no statutory
jurisdiction to regulate isolated wetlands because such regulation has not been subjected to
public notice and comment. SeeTabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 726, 729 (E.D.
Va. 1988) (holding that Corps does not have authority to regulate isolated wetlands on ground
that they are used or possibly used by migratory birds because such rule is not in accord with
Administrative Procedure Act), aft'd, 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994) (requiring agencies to submit rules that affect public
interest to public notice and comment). Other circuits either have overlooked this argument
or found the rule to be merely interpretive and not substantive, thus upholding the regulation
on statutory grounds. See Leslie Salt Co., 55 F.3d at 1393 (observing that "it is plausible to find
that the preamble is merely an interpretive rule, and thus is not subject to the notice-and-
comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act"); Hoffman Homes, 999 F.2d at 260
(focusing on definition of "waters of the United States" for "migratory bird rule" authority and
not on Corps' statement). See generally, Chertok, supra note 7, at 1144 (explaining that Corps'
statement is an interpretive rule).
79. See, e.g., LeslieSalt Co., 55 F.3d at 1393 (affirming that "'[t[he Commerce Clause power,
and thus the Clean Water Act, is broad enough to extend the Corps'jurisdiction to local waters
which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species"' (quoting Leslie Salt Co.
v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1989))); Rueth, 13 F.3d at 231 (recognizing that
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the premise that migratory birds serve as a nexus between isolated
wetlands and interstate commerce." Courts have recognized that
people spend billions of dollars each year watching, hunting, and
photographing migratory birds." Because loss of habitat is the
leading cause of declining migratory bird populations, courts have
realized that wetlands destruction reduces the amount of interstate
commerce money spent on migratory bird recreation activities.82
Isolated wetlands providing migratory bird habitats therefore are
subject to federal regulation under the Commerce Clause.
Unlike the Ninth Circuit in Leslie Salt Co., the Seventh Circuit in
Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA83 found isolated wetlands to be outside
the scope of the Clean Water Act. In Hoffman Homes, the court also
relied on the Corps' statement about migratory birds. 4 The court
applied the migratory bird rule more narrowly, however, by requiring
substantial evidence that the isolated wetland in question was a
suitable habitat for migratory birds," and found that it was not
enough that the wetlands could serve as a possible habitat for
migratory birds.86 Accordingly, the court in Hoffman Homes held that
the isolated wetland at issue was not subject to the EPA's jurisdiction
because it lacked the characteristics of habitats that migratory birds
typically find attractive.
interstate commerce is affected by wetlands used by migratory birds); Hoffman Homes, 999 F.2d
at 259 (allowing migratory birds to serve as a nexus between interstate commerce and isolated
wetlands); United States v. Sargent County Water Resource Dist., 876 F. Supp. 1081, 1086
(D.N.D. 1992) (holding that isolated wetlands are within jurisdiction of Clean Water Act when
such wetlands are important to migratory birds).
80. See Leslie Salt Co., 55 F.3d at 1396.
81. See Hoffman Homes, 999 F.2d at 261. Hunters alone spend more than $600 million each
year hunting migratory waterfowl that depend on wetlands for habitat. See Regulatory Reform Act
of 1995: Hearings on S. 851 Before the Subcomm. on Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property, and Nuclear
Safety of the Senate Comm. on the Env't and Pub. Works, 104th Cong. (1995), available in 1995 WL
435851 [hereinafter Regulatory Reform Act Heafings/EPA Testimony].
82. See Hoffman Homes, 999 F.2d at 261 ("[T]he cumulative loss of wetlands has reduced
population of many bird species and consequently the ability of people to hunt, trap, and
observe those birds.").
83. 999 F.2d 256. 262 (7th Cir. 1993).
84. See id. at 261.
85. See id. at 261-62 (determining that isolated wetland in question was not connected to
interstate commerce absent substantial evidence that it exhibited characteristics sought after by
migratory birds and given evidence that it had not been used by migratory birds in past).
86. See id. at 266 ("After April showers not every temporary wet spot necessarily becomes
subject to governmental control."). But see id. at 261 (agreeing that "the use of the word 'could'
indicates the regulation covers water whose connection to interstate commerce may be potential
rather than actual, minimal rather than substantial").
87. See id. at 262 (finding that isolated wetland was less than one acre, its only source of
water was rainfall, and migratory birds did not actually use isolated wetland collectively, leading
to conclusion that there was no substantial evidence that wetland "was suitable for migratory bird
habitat").
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The Supreme Court has not provided any direct guidance on the
constitutionality of applying section 404 of the Clean Water Act to
isolated wetlands. Furthermore, based on its denial of certiorari in
Cargill v. United States,a it is unlikely that the Court will review the
constitutionality of regulating isolated wetlands without a split among
the circuits.89 As a result, lower courts are left to grapple with how
United States v. Lopez will affect Commerce Clause challenges to the
federal regulation of isolated wetlands, a question the remaining
sections of this Comment will consider.
III. COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The Constitution delegates to Congress the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States."9
For the past sixty years, this "Commerce Clause" authority has been
interpreted broadly, with the Court subjecting federal regulations
challenged for exceeding the scope of the commerce power to a
"mere rationality" review.91 Under this standard of review, the Court
defers to legislative decisions regarding the need to regulate interstate
commerce rather than conduct its own assessment.92 The broad
scope of Congress' Commerce Clause authority is evidenced by
Supreme Court decisions upholding the regulation of activities having
only indirect effects on interstate commerce, 9' activities affecting
88. 116 S. Ct. 407 (1995).
89. See Robert Percival, Remarks at the Meeting of the Environment, Energy, and Natural
Resources Section of the District of Columbia Bar (Oct. 30, 1995) (on file with The American
University Law Review). The fact that the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Gargill v. United
States signals that the regulation of isolated wetlands is not in great jeopardy. See Nancy
Firestone, Remarks at the Meeting of the Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources Section
of the District of Columbia Bar (Oct. 30, 1995) (on file with TheAmerican University Law Review).
90. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cd. 3.
91. The "mere rationality" review is a two-part test. First, a court "must defer to a
congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce if there is any rational
basis for such a finding." Hodel v. Vi-ginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
276 (1981). Second, the court must determine if the regulatory means by which the policy is
implemented is reasonably related to the policy objective. See id.; see also Hodel v. Indiana, 452
U.S. 314,323-24 (1981) (stating that courts may invalidate legislation if there is no rational basis
for a congressional finding that regulated activity in question affected interstate commerce or
if there is no rational relationship between regulatory means chosen and ends sought).
For a survey of Supreme Court cases developing Commerce Causejurisprudence during the
last 60 years, see infra notes 96-113.
92. SeeUnited States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,121 (1941) (holding that Congress "may choose
the means reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permitted end, even though they involve
control of intrastate commerce" when reguating interstate commerce).
93. SeeNLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1937) (abandoning"indirect"
and "direct" effects test by asserting that if activity has close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce, Congress has power to regulate that activity).
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interstate commerce only when considered collectively,94 and even
activities that are purely local in nature.95
The Supreme Court's, deference to Congress' exercise of its
authority under the Commerce Clause can be traced to its holding in
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.96 In Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., the regulation of labor practices involving the
production of goods was challenged for exceeding the scope of
Congress' commerce power on the theory that it was an attempt to
regulate a local activity.97 Previously, activities that occurred entirely
within state lines, such as the production of goods, were thought to
be beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause.9" In a landmark
decision, the Court upheld the regulation, determining that Congress'
commerce power is plenary and may be exercised to regulate local
activities that threaten interstate commerce.99 This holding paved
the way for later decisions validating the regulation of local activities
indirectly affecting interstate commerce.1°
The Court's decision in Wickard v. Filburn0 ' also broadened
Congress' commerce power. Wickard involved the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938, authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to
set quotas on the amount of wheat grown on a farm regardless of
whether the wheat was to be used intrastate or sold through interstate
commerce." 2 The Act even went so far as to permit federal regula-
94. SeeWickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) (establishing that cumulative effect
of isolated activities may be considered in Commerce Clause analysis).
95. See Hode4 452 U.S. at 281 (allowing regulation of local activity that affects more than
one state).
96. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 41 (holding that intrastate activities could
be within scope of Congress' commerce power if regulated activity had "close and substantial
relation to interstate commerce").
97. See id. at 25.
98. BeforeJones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the greatest limitation on the commerce power was
based on a distinction between transporting goods and manufacturing goods. See Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936) (finding that labor provisions in Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act regulated local activity of production and not interstate commerce). The
Court reasoned that the production of goods was a local activity beyond the reach of the
Commerce Clause because it took place entirely within state lines. See Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251,272 (1918) (observing that statute prohibiting companies who employed children
under statutorily specified age from transporting goods in interstate commerce was beyond
scope of Commerce Clause because statute regulated production, which is local activity).
99. SeeJones &Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 37 (finding that even intrastate activities may
affect interstate commerce in way that warrants Congress to regulate such local activity).
100. See i&e at 36. The Court stated, "The congressional authority to protect interstate
commerce from burdens and obstructions is not limited to transactions which can be deemed
to be an essential part of a 'flow' of interstate or foreign commerce." Id. The Court held that
"[b]urdens and obstructions may be due to injurious action springing from other sources." lIL
For a discussion of the further expansion of Commerce Clause jurisprudence as a result of
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., see infra notes 101-113.
101. 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942).
102. SeeWickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 115 (1942).
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tion of the amount of wheat grown on a farm for personal consump-
tion." 3 The Supreme Court upheld the Act, finding that Congress
could regulate a local activity with substantial effects on interstate
commerce pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority regardless of
whether the activity has a direct or indirect effect on interstate
commerce."° The Court reasoned that Congress did not abuse its
commerce power in passing the Act because homegrown wheat
supplies compete with wheat in interstate commerce. 05 Thus, even
though one farmer's consumption of wheat had only a trivial effect
on interstate commerce, "taken together with that of many others
similarly situated, [personal consumption of homegrown wheat] is far
from trivial."'0 6 This rationale became the basis for what is known
as the "cumulative effects" doctrine.
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,107 the
Court repeated its broad interpretation of Congress' commerce
power.03 At issue was the constitutionality of the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act.0 9 The Act established a "nationwide
program to protect society and the environment from the adverse
effects of surface coal mining."10 The Act was challenged because
it regulated mining activity on private lands located entirely within
state lines."' The Court held that local activities causing environ-
mental problems, such as air or water pollution, were within the scope
of activities that Congress can regulate under its Commerce Clause
authority."2  In reaching this decision, the Court deferred to
congressional findings that surface mining adversely affected interstate
commerce by contributing to water pollution and other environmen-
103. See id. at 119.
104. See id. at 128.
105. See id. at 127 (finding that personal consumption of homegrown wheat is difficult to
predict and thus has effect on interstate commerce).
106. Id. at 127-28; see also United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 734 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying
"cumulative effects" principle to regulation of adjacent wetlands when government was unable
to show substantial effects on interstate commerce). See generally DennisJ. Priolo, Section 404 of
the Clean Water Act: The Case for Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction over Isolated Wetlands, 30 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 91 (1995) (advancing argument for application of "cumulative effect" doctrine
to regulation of isolated wetlands).
107. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
108. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 282 (1981).
109. See 30 U.S.C. § 1211 (1976 & Supp. III).
110. Id.
111. See Hodl 452 U.S. at 275.
112. See id, at 282 (confirming lower court decisions that Commerce Clause authorizes
Congress to regulate "activities causing air or water pollution, or other environmental hazards
that may have effects in more than one State").
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tal hazards such as flooding and loss of habitat."'
As the foregoing cases illustrate, the Supreme Court has interpreted
Congress' Commerce Clause authority very broadly. In considering
Commerce Clause challenges to isolated wetland regulations, lower
courts have followed the Court's six decades of Commerce Clause
precedent, deferring to legislative judgment and administrative
interpretations. 4 Although the Supreme Court occasionally has
required that the regulated activity substantially affect interstate
commerce, the term substantial has been interpreted very loosely."'
IV. UNTED STATES V. LOPEZ
The Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez' 6 indicated a willing-
ness to recognize limits on Congress' Commerce Clause authority for
the first time in sixty years. In a 5-4 decision with two concurring
opinions and three separate dissenting opinions, the Court deter-
mined that Congress did not have the power to regulate the posses-
sion of handguns in public schools." 7 The majority opinion,
written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that only commercial activity
that substantially affects interstate commerce may be regulated by
Congress.1
18
A. Facts of Lopez
The federal statute challenged in United States v. Lopez was the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990.11 The Act made possession of
113. See id. at 277, 279, 280. Destruction of isolated wetlands contributes to many of the
same environmental problems mentioned in HodeL See generally Regulatoy Reform Act of 1995:
Hearings on S. 851 Before the Subcomm. on Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property, and Nuclear Safety of
the Senate Comm. on the Env't and Pub. Works, 104th Cong. (1995), available in 1995 WL 460623
[hereinafter Regulatory Reform Act Hearings/NWF Testimony] (statement of Jan Goldman-Carter,
Counsel for Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n) (testifying on adverse environmental effects that stem from
destruction of isolated wetlands).
114. See supra note 79 (listing cases challenging Congress' authority to regulate isolated
wetlands under Commerce Clause).
115. When asked by a congressional committee if Congress could regulate crimes
traditionally regulated by the states, Justice Scalia answered that Congress could regulate such
crimes as long as they affected interstate commerce, which "doesn't take much." See David 0.
Stewart, The Supreme Court Has Yet to Reveal the True Significance of Lopez, A.B.A.J., July 1995, at
46; see also United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1657 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (using
word "significantly" rather than "substantially" because, although the word "substantial" was used
sometimes in prior cases, "the word 'substantial' implies a somewhat narrower power than recent
precedent suggests").
116. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
117. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 (holding that activity was not economic in nature, had no
substantial effects on interstate commerce and thus was not within reach of Congress' commerce
authority).
118. See id. at 1630.
119. See 18 U.S.C. § 9 22 (q) (1988 & Supp. V).
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firearms within school zones a criminally punishable federal of-
fense. 12°  On March 10, 1992, a member of the school faculty at
Edison High School in San Antonio received an anonymous tip over
the phone.121  Thereafter, school authorities discovered Alfonso
Lopez, Jr., a high school student, carrying an unloaded gun tucked
into the waist of his pants and five bullets in his pocket.12 2 Lopez
had no previous criminal record and was scheduled to graduate in a
few weeks. 23 When questioned by authorities, Lopez explained that
he had received the gun from someone with instructions to deliver it
to another individual after school.124  The gun was to be used in a
gang war." Lopez was charged with violating the Gun-Free School
Zones Act.126  He challenged the Act on the ground that it was
beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause. 27 Lopez asserted that
possession of a gun within a thousand feet of a school does not
128substantially affect interstate commerce.
B. The Court's Opinion
The Court applied a two-step analysis to determine whether the
regulated activity was within the scope of Congress' Commerce Clause
authority. The first step required that the regulated activity be a
commercial or economic endeavor.129 Second, the regulated activity
must have a substantial effect on interstate commerce." ° The Court
determined that the Gun-Free School Zones Act failed both steps of
the test, concluding (1) that possession of a handgun is not a
commercial activity;' 3' and (2) that possession of a gun in a school
120. Under the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, it is a federal offense "for any individual
knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to
believe, is a school zone." Id. § 922(q) (1) (A).
121. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626; see alsoJoseph Calve, Anatomy of a Landmark CoNN. L.
TRIB., Aug. 14, 1995, at 1 (describing sequence of events that led to Lopez's federal indictment).
122. See Lopt, 115 S. Ct. at 1626; see also Calve, supra note 121, at 1.
123. See Calve, supra note 121, at 1.
124. See Brief for Respondent at 2, Lopez (No. 93-1260).
125. See id.
126. See Lope, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
127. See id. ("[Lopez] moved to dismiss his federal indictment on the ground that § 922(q)
'is unconstitutional as it is beyond the power of Congress to legislate control over our public
schools."' (quoting Appellant's Petition for Certiorari at 55a)).
128. See Brief for Respondent at 8, Lopez (No. 93-1260).
129. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct at 1631-32 (concluding that criminal statute in question was not
related to any type of economic activity).
130. See id. at 1630 ("[T] he proper test requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity
'substantially affects, interstate commerce.").
131. See id. at 1631 (finding that criminal statute in question did not regulate activity related
to commercial transaction).
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zone, even if viewed cumulatively, does not have a substantial effect
on interstate commerce. 32
In determining whether possession of a gun in a school zone
substantially affects interstate commerce, the Court considered several
factors. 33 For example, the Court indicated that if the statute had
required a case-by-case determination of a connection to interstate
commerce, the statute would have been a constitutional exercise of
the power of Congress to regulate commerce." In addition, the
Court searched the statute and its legislative history for congressional
findings that possession of guns in- school zones affected interstate
commerce.3" The Court found none, noting that no effects on
interstate commerce were "visible to the naked eye" nor discernible
from the legislative history."6 Finally, the fact that education and
132. See id. at 1630, 1634 (distinguishing case from prior cases that relied on cumulative
effects of regulated activity to establish connection to interstate commerce).
133. SeeVicki C.Jackson, Cautioning Congress to Pull Back, LEGAL TIMES,July 31, 1995, at S31
(suggesting that areas historically left to state to regulate, activities commercial in nature, and
legislative findings of interstate commerce all were factors used to determine whether interstate
commerce was substantially affected).
134. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (indicating that, had regulation limited its jurisdiction to
those instances of gun possession in school zones that affected interstate commerce, it would
have been constitutional). Lopez raises the question of whether the cumulative effects doctrine
is still alive. See Kim Cathourn, Supreme Court Interprets Scope of Congressional Authority Under
Interstate Commerce Claus HOUSTON LAW., July/Aug. 1995, at 15. But see John P. Dwyer, The
Commerce Clause and the Limits of Congressional Authority to Regulate the Environment, 25 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,421, 10,423 (1995) (observing that Supreme Court did not overrule
.cumulative effects" cases and distinguishing Lopez from such cases).
Assuming that the "cumulative effects" doctrine has not been overruled, the regulation of
isolated wetlands properly is limited to those wetlands that affect interstate commerce because
"[t]raditionally, the Corps has considered on a case-by-case basis whether a wetland has the
requisite interstate nexus and is, thus, regulated under Section 404." Sharon M. Mattox, The
Impact of Environmental Law on Real Estate and Other Commercial Transactions, ALI-ABA COURSE OF
STUDY 603, 614 (1995).
135. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32 (stating that Court will consider congressional findings
concerning effects on interstate commerce when reviewing constitutionality of utilization of
commerce power).
"There is no question that the systematic destruction of the Nation's wetlands is causing
serious, permanent ecological damage .... The unregulated destruction of these areas is a
matter which needs to be corrected and which implementation of section 404 has attempted to
achieve." S. REP. No. 95-370, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326,4336. Although
the Act's legislative history does not mention explicitly isolated wetlands, Congress made no
attempt to differentiate between the types of wetlands covered by section 404. SeeJackson &
Armitage, supra note 63, at 10,372.
It is noteworthy that the Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986 makes express findings
of the commercial value of wetlands. See 16 U.S.C. § 3901(a) (4) (1994). For instance, the Act
states that wetlands "provide significant recreational and commercial benefits, including...
support for a major portion of the Nation's multimillion dollar annual fur and hide harvest; and
fishing, hunting, birdwatching, nature observation and other wetland-related recreational
activities that generate billions of dollars annually." Id.
136. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
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the enforcement of criminal laws traditionally have been areas
regulated by states also played a role in the Court's decision."l 7
It is worth noting that the Court was divided in reaching its
decision in Lopez." The opinion of the Court was written by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and
Thomas.'39 Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, joined by
Justice O'Connor, asserting that the statute infringed on the Tenth
Amendment and that states were better suited than the federal
government to find the best means to "deter students from carrying
guns on school premises."'1 0 Justice Thomas, in a separate concur-
rence, applauded the Court's decision to return to the original
understanding of the Commerce Clause.'41 Justices Stevens, Souter,
and Breyer each filed dissenting opinions." In the longest of the
dissents, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Souter and
Stevens, disagreed with the framing of the issue." He argued that
the proper Commerce Clause analysis is not whether there are
substantial effects on interstate commerce, but "whether Congress
could have had a rational basis for finding a significant (or substantial)
connection between gun-related school violence and interstate
commerce."
144
C. Effect of the Lopez Decision
The Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Lopez signaled a
new willingness to limit Congress' Commerce Clause authority."
137. See id, (opining that Gun-Free School Zones Act could not be found constitutional
without perpetuating notion that there are no limits to Congress' power under Commerce
Clause).
The regulation of isolated wetlands under section 404 of the Clean Water Act governs land
use. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g) (1) (1994). Although land use is an area traditionally regulated by
the states, federal environmental laws regulating local land use have been upheld by the
Supreme Court when the regulated land use affects interstate commerce. See Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,281 (1981) (rejecting argument that Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act "regulates land use, a local activity not affecting interstate
commerce"); see also Dwyer, supra note 134, at 10,429-30 ("It is striking... that when the Lopez
majority identified, areas of traditional state concern-education, criminal law, and family law-it
made no mention of land use regulations.").
138. See generally CharlesJ. Russo, United States v. Lopez and the Demise of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act: Legislative Over-Reaching or Judicial Nit-Picking?, 99 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 11 (1995)
(discussing six different opinions in Lopez).
139. SeeLopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1624.
140. Id at 1640-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
141. See id. at 1642-43 (Thomas, J., concurring).
142. See id. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1651, (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 1657
(Breyer,J., dissenting).
143. See id. at 1659 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
144. Id (BreyerJ., dissenting).
145. SeeJackson, supra note 133, at 531 ("[F]or the first time since the New Deal, the Court
struck down a Federal statute regulating private conduct as exceeding Congress' Commerce
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The Court stated that commerce authority should be used only to
regulate commercial activities that are related substantially to
interstate commerce. 46 As one commentator has observed, howev-
er, "we are still a long way from a solid consensus on these matters in
the Supreme Court, let alone in the nation. It is difficult,
therefore, to predict what long term effects, if any, this case will have
on Congress' Commerce Clause authority. In the short term, it is safe
to postulate that Congress might not be accorded the same degree of
judicial deference."4 As a result, some environmental regulations
based on the Commerce Clause could be in jeopardy."4
V. APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ TO ISOLATED WETLANDS
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez likely will
result in a surge of Commerce Clause challenges. 50 At least one
commentator has speculated that some environmental protection laws,
including those regulating intrastate activities such as the filling of
isolated wetlands, will be attacked.' Opponents of federal regula-
tion of isolated wetlands argue that filling an isolated wetland is a
local activity not affecting interstate commerce.' The following
discussion examines the ecological functions and connections to other
ecosystems of isolated wetlands and contends that section 404 of the
Clean Water Act-as applied to isolated wetlands-is a permissible
exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.
A. Commercial Activity
Lopez set forth a more rigorous Commerce Clause analysis than
prior Supreme Court cases. 5 The analysis applied in Lopez differs
Clause power.").
146. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
147. Wilfred M. McClay, A More Perfect Union? Toward a New Federalism, 100 COMMENTARY,
Sept. 1995, at 28 (noting preponderance of 5-4 decisions in federalism cases).
148. See The Supreme Court: Attack and Retrea THE ECONOMIST, May 6, 1995, at 29 ("Lopez may
prove to be a new turn in commerce-clause jurisprudence, or it may be merely a one-off. All
depends on whether future courts use it to knock down more laws.").
149. See Dwyer, supra note 134, at 10,421 ("Conceivably, a few statutes, such as the
Endangered Species Act... and the Safe Drinking Water Act .... may now be vulnerable to
a Commerce Clause Challenge.") (citations omitted).
150. See Biskupic, supra note 17, at A3 (speculating that Lopez calls into question "a whole
body of federal criminal law, federal environmental law, [and) societal policies").
151. See Chertok, supra note 7, at 1189 n.58 ("The Supreme Court's recent decision in United
States v. Lopez ... may presage further litigation challenging jurisdiction over 'isolated'
wetlands.").
152. See supra notes 9-10 (discussing view that isolated wetlands cannot be regulated under
Commerce Clause).
153. See supra Parts flI and LV (discussing Commerce Clause jurisprudence and Commerce
Clause analysis in Lopez).
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from established doctrine in that it requires the regulated activity to
be commercial or economic in nature." Rather than reversing
precedent, the Court attempted to distinguish its decision from prior
cases in which it upheld the regulation at issue under the cumulative
effects doctrine.1 5
First, the Court placed great weight on the fact that the challenged
provision of the Gun-Free School Zones Act was not related to any
kind of commercial activity.156  Unfortunately, the Court did not
define what constitutes commercial activity.157  It therefore is
difficult to predict what kind of effect, if any, the commercial activity
requirement will have on future Commerce Clause challenges.
158
Nevertheless, if the regulated activity in question is related to some
sort of economic enterprise, the regulation should clear the first
hurdle the Court set forth in Lopmz159  Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act regulates the discharge of fill or dredged materials into
wetlands."6  This activity almost always is the direct result of some
commercial endeavor.'6 ' Typically, wetlands are filled in order to
convert them into areas more suitable for shopping malls, housing
developments, parking lots, and industry.62 Thus, the regulation
154. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630-31 (1995) (stressing that regulated
activities must be connected to or result from commercial activity under Commerce Clause
analysis). Justice Breyer, writing for four dissenters, criticized Chief Justice Rehnquist for
distinguishing between commercial and non-commercial activities, stating that the distinction
is contrary to the precedent established by other Commerce Clause cases. See id at 1663-64
(BreyerJ., dissenting) (asserting that focus of Court has not been "upon the economic nature
of the activity regulated ... [but] upon whether that activity affected interstate or foreign
commerce").
155. See id. at 1630-31.
156. See id. (reasoning that statutes that regulate commercial activity are constitutional, but
finding that statute in question did not regulate commercial activity); see also Dwyer, supra note
134, at 10,423 (observing that Chief Justice Rehnquist distinguished Lopez from Wwckard by
concluding that "neither the 1990 firearm statute nor Mr. Lopez's possession of a gun in a
school zone was related to interstate commerce").
157. SeeJackson, supra note 138, at S31 (noting whether economic activity will be interpreted
narrowly or broadly has yet to be determined).
158. See The Supreme Court: Attack and Retreat, supra note 148, at 29 ("[I he Lopez precedent
gives courts an opportunity to place further restrictions on Congress' power, but it does not
require them to do so."). See generally Stewart, supra note 115, at 46 (suggesting that standard
applied in Lopez was more demanding than standard usually applied in Commerce Clause cases
and that such standard may not be applied in future cases).
159. See Lopez 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32 (requiring activity regulated under commerce Clause to
be commercial or economic in nature).
160. See33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(1) (1994).
161. See Dwyer, supra note 134, at 10,427 (stating that majority of environmental laws are
aimed at commercial activity).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 124 (1985)
(discharging fill materials into wetlands in order to construct housing development); Rueth v.
EPA, 13 F.3d 227, 228 (7th Cir. 1993) (discharging fill and dredged materials into wetlands for
purpose of residential development); United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 722 (3d Cir. 1993)
(filling wetlands in order to build garage for truck repair business); Hoffman Homes, Inc. v.
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of isolated wetlands should satisfy the first prong of the Commerce
Clause analysis enunciated in Lopez.
Second, the Court stated that the criminal statute at issue in Lopez
was not "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity,
in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the
intrastate activity were regulated." 63 The Clean Water Act, on the
other hand, is an environmental protection statute that regulates
commercial activity,"M and section 404 is an essential part of the
greater federal policy of preventing water pollution." Section 404
of the Clean Water Act is further distinguishable from the criminal
statute at issue in Lopez because the Supreme Court has held the
"Commerce Clause [to be] broad enough to permit congressional
regulation of activities causing air or water pollution, or other
environmental hazards that may have effect in more than one
State.""6  Thus, the regulation of isolated wetlands should be
upheld if the goals of the Clean Water Act would be undermined
without such regulation.167
Federal regulations prohibiting the discharge of pollutants into
isolated wetlands provide a minimum nationwide standard for clean
water." When a seemingly local activity, such as the filling of
isolated wetlands, affects more than one state, the Commerce Clause
permits the regulation of that activity in order to establish a national
EPA, 999 F.2d 256, 257-58 (7th Cir. 1993) (discharging fill material to convert wetlands into
subdivision); see also Regulatory Reform Act Hearings/NWF Testimony, supra note 113 (statement of
Jan Goldman-Carter, Counsel for Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n) (observing that wetlands have been
destroyed in order to build homes, farms, airports, industries, and roads).
163. Lopez, 115 S. C. at 1631.
164. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251; supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text (asserting that § 404
regulates commercial activities).
165. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631; Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 n.17 (1981). The
Court in Hodel stated-
A complex regulatory program... can survive a Commerce Clause challenge without
a showing that every single facet of the program is independently and directly related
to a valid congressional goal. It is enough that the challenged provisions are an
integral part of the regulatory program and that the regulatory scheme when
considered as a whole satisfies this test.
idM; see also S. REP. No. 95-370, at 75 (1977) ("To limit the jurisdiction of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act with reference to discharges of the pollutants of dredged or fill material
would cripple efforts to achieve the act's objectives."), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.CAN. 4326, 4400.
166. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 282 (1981).
167. The primary goal of the Clean Water Act is "to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a). For a discussion
of how isolated wetlands function to improve water quality, see infra notes 203-210 and
accompanying text.
168. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (indicating that Act's express purpose is "to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.").
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standard. 9 This standard prevents states from engaging in a "race
to the bottom," whereby, in the absence of federal regulations, states
would institute lax environmental regulations to attract economic
development. 170  For instance, if Virginia allowed the discharge of
fill and dredged materials on all wetlands, but Maryland regulated this
kind of activity, developers likely would prefer Virginia for its absence
of regulations. As a result of Virginia's lower standard for clean water,
Maryland's economy and efforts to maintain water quality and
migratory bird populations would be undermined.7
The destruction of isolated wetlands contributes to increased water
pollution and other environmental hazards such as flooding and the
loss of species. Unfortunately, environmental problems are
widespread and usually are not contained within state lines173 What
appears to be a local activity can have national, if not global,
ramifications when the cumulative effects of such activity are factored
into the equation. 74 Accordingly, Commerce Clause jurisprudence
allows for the regulation of local activities causing environmental
problems that "have effect in more than one State."'7 5
B. Substantial Effects on Interstate Commerce
The second prong of the Commerce Clause analysis established in
Lopez requires that the regulated activity substantially affect interstate
169. See Hode 452 U.S. at 281 (rejecting argument that Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act "regulates land use, a local activity not affecting interstate commerce").
170. SeeDwyer, supranote 134, at 10,429 (observing that Hodeldiscussed "race to the bottom"
theory and disparity in minimum water quality standards adopted by states as "constitutional
basis for federal environmental legislation").
171. See infra notes 186-90 and accompanying text (illustrating ecological connections
between isolated wetlands and other bodies of water).
172. See infra notes 191-217 and accompanying text (describing ecological and commercial
functions of isolated wetlands and damage resulting from their destruction).
173. The expansion of international environmental law is evidence that environmental
problems are widespread. Edith Brown Weiss found that there are almost 900 international
environmental law agreements. SeeEDrrH BROWN WEISS ETAL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW: BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND REFERENCES, at ix (1992).
174. The cumulative effect doctrine apparently was upheld in Lopez See 115 S. Ct. at 1628,
1630 (recognizing "cumulative effects" doctrine of Wickard v. Filbum as part of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence); see Dwyer, supra note 134, at 10,427 (insisting that "cumulative effects" doctrine
survived Lopez); Stewart, supra note 115, at 46 (observing that ChiefJustice Rehnquist's opinion
in Lopezaffirmed cases such as Wikard v. Filbumin which "cumulative effects" doctrine was estab-
lished).
The current system of regulation, however, does not allow for an accurate determination of
the cumulative effects of discharging fill materials into wetlands. See generally NATALIE R.
SEXTON, EFFECTS OF SEcTION 404 PERMrrS ON WETLANDS IN NORTH DAKOTA 15 (U.S. Dep't of
the Interior, Nat'l Biological Survey 1994) (concluding that lack of review of discharges in
wetlands below one acre in size makes it difficult to determine cumulative effect that such
discharges have on environment).
175. Hode, 452 U.S. at 282; see supra Parts III and IV (describing Commerce Clause
jurisprudence and its impact on Lopiz decision).
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commerce. 6 Again, the Supreme Court provided few clues as to
what constitutes a "substantial effect."177 The majority opinion
reasoned that the connection between gun possession in a school
zone and interstate commerce was unsubstantiated."7 Apparently,
a tenuous connection between the regulated activity and interstate
commerce no longer will be sufficient to meet the substantial effects
standard that the Court articulated in Lopez.1
7 9
Unlike the regulated activity at issue in Lopez, however, the
widespread destruction of isolated wetlands substantially affects
interstate commerce. Although isolated wetlands once were thought
to be of little value because they did not perform the same functions
as adjacent wetlands,"s scientific studies have proven this assertion
to be false.' Scientists generally agree that wetlands-isolated as
well as adjacent-serve important ecological functions, including flood
control, ground water recharge and purification, water quality
improvement, and habitat provision to numerous biologically diverse
species.8 2 Recently, Congress asked the National Resource Council
to form a committee to study scientifically the criteria used to identify
wetlands."ta The committee concluded that "[t]he scientific basis
for policies that attribute less importance to ... isolated wetlands
than to other wetlands is weak.""a3 This conclusion was based on
the finding that isolated wetlands perform the same functions as other
wetlands.185
176. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995) ("[T]he proper test requires
an analysis of whether the regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce.").
177. See id. at 1631 (stating that Congress "normally is not required to make formal findings
as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce" to justify legislation).
178. See id. at 1634 (requiring more than inferences to show that regulated activity
substantially affects interstate commerce).
179. See id. (arguing that relying on such limited connections would "convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the
states").
180. See Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 961 F.2d 1310, 1316 (7th Cir. 1992) (attributing
functions such as flood control and filtering pollutants from water to adjacent wetlands but not
to isolated wetlands).
181. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COuNcIL, supra note 72, at 156 (recognizing that isolated
wetlands perform same functions as other wetlands).
182. See id. at 34-40; see also WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, supra note 46, at 4-6 (listing flood
control, water quality, waterfowl habitat, biological diversity, groundwater recharge, erosion and
land formation, and recreation as reasons "why wetlands should be protected");Jon A. Kusler
et al., Wetlands, Sci. AM., Jan. 1994, at 64B; John G. Mitchell, Our Disappearing Wetlands, 182
NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Oct. 1992, at 14-15 (comparing biological productivity of wetlands to tropical
rainforest).
183. See NATIONAL RESEARCH CouNcil, supra note 72, at xiii (stating that Congress asked EPA
to direct National Research Council study wetlands).
184. Id. at 156.
185. See id. (concluding that wetland functions are independent of whether wetland is
adjacent to or isolated from body of water).
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Indeed, the term "isolated wetlands" is somewhat of a
misnomer when basic ecological principles are considered. Some
isolated wetlands have subsurface connections to other bodies of
water, such as lakes, rivers, or streams;186 others are ecologically
connected to lakes, rivers, streams, tidal areas, and other wetlands
that also serve as habitats for migratory birds8 7 and other
wildlife.1 88 The Supreme Court acknowledged these characteristics
of wetlands in Riverside Bayview Homes when it contemplated how
functions such as flood control, water purification, and food chain
production further the purpose of the Clean Water Act."9 Thus,
relying solely on the presence of migratory birds on isolated wetlands
to establish a connection to interstate commerce ignores the diverse
array of functions isolated wetlands serve that also affect interstate
commerce.
190
Both district and appellate courts have recognized that the
destruction of isolated wetlands that serve as habitats for migratory
birds could have a substantial effect on interstate commerce."' As
a result of the large number of bird species they support, wetlands
often serve as recreational areas for bird-related activities. 19 Each
year, Americans spend more than one billion dollars "hunting,
trapping, and observing migratory birds."
93
Wetlands provide a unique habitat, exhibiting both aquatic and
terrestrial characteristics, that supports biodiversity.'" Many isolated
186. See id. (stating that wetland functions such as maintenance of water quality do not
depend on whether wetland is adjacent to or isolated from surface waters when isolated wetland
has ground water connection with surface waters).
187. See id. ("Small, shallow wetlands that are isolated from rivers are frequently important
to waterfowl.").
188. Scientific studies have established that black bears rely on isolated wetlands as a food
source and for shelter. SeeThomas Be Vier, Satellites Will Track Nations First GlobalBear, GAmar
NEws SERv., June 13, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2899113.
189. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 134-35 (1985).
190. See infra notes 198-217 and accompanying text (describing commercial functions of
isolated wetlands).
191. See sources cited supra note 79 (listing cases finding relationship between migratory
birds and interstate commerce). But see Lopez and the Glancing Birds, WASH. TIMEs, May 3, 1995,
atA16 (commenting that migratory bird rule is insufficient nexus to withstand scrutiny of Lopez
Court).
192. See Tom Wharton, Celebrating the Return of Wetland Birds, SALT LAKE Tram., May 7, 1996,
at Cl (describing "[a]wesome spectacle" of 340 species of birds that migrate in spring).
193. Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256,261 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Regulator Reform
Act Hearings/EPA Testimony, supra note 81 (statement of Robert Perciasepe, Assistant Adm'r of
EPA) (stating that more than $600 million dollars is spent annually on hunting wetland-
dependent waterfowl).
194. See Kusler et al., supra note 182, at 68 (observing that wetlands have characteristics of
both aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems, which explains wide variety of species found there).
According to Cornell University ecologist Barbara Bedford, wetlands that are wet for only a few
weeks each year are among the most biologically diverse. See Betsy Carpenter, In a AMurky
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wetlands serve as spawning, breeding, feeding, and nesting grounds
for migratory birds, fish, and other wildlife.195 Shallow isolated
wetlands are especially important to migratory birds because they
provide the first available supply of food in the spring.1 98 The
Corps has identified the role of isolated wetlands in supporting
biodiversity as a factor in delineating wetlands that are subject to
federal regulation.
197
In addition to providing habitats for migratory birds and promoting
biodiversity, isolated wetlands serve commercial purposes that
substantially affect interstate commerce. 98 For instance, isolated
wetlands can play important roles in flood control, water quality, and
water supply."9 Wetlands prevent $30.9 billion of flood damage
from occurring each year due to their ability to absorb great
quantities of water.2 °" Adjacent wetlands prevent flood damage by
soaking up overflow from rivers and streams.20 Isolated wetlands
also contribute to flood control by absorbing rain and storm water
runoff. °2
Moreover, isolated wetlands help to improve the quality of both
surface and ground water.20 3 This is especially true in farming areas
where storm water runoff is saturated with high concentrations of
Quagmire: The Wetlands Need Protection. But Does that Mean Every Soggy Acre?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., June 3, 1991, at 45. For example, she found "128 species of plants in one 5-by-5 meter
square" in a wetland in upstate NewYork. Id. She compares the destruction of wetlands to the
destruction of the rainforest because both are habitats "rich in species." See id.
195. See Kusler et al., supra note 182, at 64B (describing functions of wetlands).
196. See NATIONAL RESEARCH CouNciL, supra note 72, at 156 (establishing that shallow
isolated wetlands thaw earlier than deeper wetlands, allowing for early development of
invertebrate populations that are source of food for waterfowl).
197. See 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (1986) (defining waters covered by the Clean Water Act to
include those that provide habitat to migratory birds or "would be used as habitat by
endangered species").
198. See Kusler et al., supra note 182, at 64B (describing wetlands as "nature's kidneys" due
to their ability to reduce flood damage and water pollution).
199. See generally Regulatory Reform Act Hearings/NWF Testimony, supra note 113 (statement of
Jan Goldman-Carter, Counsel for Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n) (documenting commercial functions of
isolated wetlands).
200. See id. Wetlands that are flooded one foot in depth have the ability to store water at
a rate of 36,000 gallons per acre tempQrarily. See id.
201. See Kusler et al., supra note 182, at 64B, 67 (noting that flooding is more severe when
wetlands are developed into areas with no natural absorbent capacities).
202. See Regulatory Reform Act Hearings/NWF Testimony, supra note 113 (statement of Jan
Goldman-Carter, Counsel for Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n). "Prairie potholes," small isolated wetlands
scattered through the plains, help control flooding by reducing the rate at which runoff moves
from highlands to flood plains. See id. As prairie potholes have been destroyed to build
parking lots, subdivisions, shopping malls, and roads, flooding has increased. See id.; see also A
Swamp in the House, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 28, 1995, at 25 (stating that prairie potholes
provide "$150 million worth of free flood control each year").
203. See Carpenter, supra note 194, at 96 ("Microorganisms in wetland soils transform several
pollutants into benign substances. Nitrates from agricultural runoff, for instance, can be
converted into nitrogen gas, which escapes harmlessly into the atmosphere.").
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phosphorous and nitrogen due to frequent fertilizer use.2°4 Heavy
rains wash fertilizers away from crops, causing storm water runoff to
become laden with nutrients and chemicals present in the fertiliz-
ers. 05 This polluted runoff often flows directly into lakes, rivers,
and sewer systems.0 6 Isolated wetlands can interrupt the flow of
this storm water by absorbing the water and filtering out the pollut-
ants.207 As a result, isolated wetlands drastically reduce the amount
of pollution that eventually reaches surface waters and sewer
systems. 20 8  In fact, isolated wetlands have been incorporated into
storm water runoff treatment systems because of their natural ability
to remove pollutants and sediment while absorbing water. 9
Therefore, isolated wetlands, along with other wetlands, naturally
perform the commercial function of improving surface water quality,
thereby reducing water treatment costs by as much as seventy billion
dollars. 0
Isolated wetlands also recharge and purify ground water sup-
plies.1 In the midwest, isolated wetlands have been recognized for
their ability to replenish ground water aquifers and to maintain
elevated water tables.2 1 2  Furthermore, isolated wetlands have the
204. See generally William T. Peterjohn & David L. Correll, Nutrient Dynamicks in an Agricultural
Watershed: Observations on the Role of a Riparian Forest4 65 ECOLOGY 1466 (1984) (studying levels
of nutrient concentrations in agricultural stormwater runoff before moving through riparian
forest and levels found in groundwater). Iowa State University botany professor Arnold van der
Valk links the loss of 95% of Iowa's wetlands, including isolated wetlands known as prairie
potholes, to the dangerously high levels of contamination in Des Moines' drinking water supply.
See Carpenter, supra note 194, at 96.
205. See generally Peterjohn & Correll, supra note 204, at 1466 (studying nutrient loading of
stormwater runoff over agricultural fields and removal of some nutrients from runoff in riparian
forest before runoff reaches stream).
206. See id. at 1474.
207. See id.
208. See Regulatory Reform Act Hearings/EPA Testimony, supra note 81 (statement of Robert
Perciasepe, Assistant Adm'r of EPA) (stating that wetlands naturally function to remove
pollutants from waters).
209. See Bruce H. McArthur, The Use of Isolated Wetlands in Florida for Stormwater Treatment, in
WETLANDS: CONCERNS AND SUCCESSES 185, 192 (David W. Fisk ed., 1989) (providing developers
with low cost alternative to meet water quality standards by incorporating isolated wetlands into
storm water runoff treatment system). Isolated wetlands that are used for storm water runoff
treatment can contribute to housing developments in other ways as well. If the system is
designed and maintained properly, the isolated wetland can provide habitat to wildlife, and thus
increase the recreational and aesthetic value of the development. See id.
210. See Regulatory Reform Act Hearings/NWF Testimony, supra note 113 (statement of Jan
Goldman-Carter, Counsel for Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n) (noting that constructing water treatment
systems is much more costly than allowing wetlands to remove pollutants naturally).
211. See WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, supra note 46, at 5-6 (noting ability of some wetlands to
recharge aquifers that provide drinking water); Regulatory Reform Act Hearings/NWF Testimony,
supra note 113 (statement ofJan Goldman-Carter, Counsel for Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n) (describing
role wetlands play in ground water recharge).
212. See Regulatory Reform Act Hearings/NWF Testimony, supra note 113 (statement of Jan
Goldman-Carter, Counsel for Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n) (documenting role prairie potholes have in
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natural ability to purify ground water by removing sediment, heavy
metals, nitrogen, and phosphorous from water destined for ground
water aquifers."' In short, wetlands absorb rain water, filtering it
as it percolates down to ground water systems. 14 Isolated wetlands
thus perform a particularly valuable function in areas that rely on
ground water aquifers for drinking water. For example, isolated
wetlands in the midwest known as "prairie potholes" 215 absorb
nitrogen, making ground water safer to drink.216  As a result, they
substantially improve both the quality and quantity of drinking water
that is available for many Americans, thereby furthering the goals of
the Clean Water Act.
217
In sum, by serving commercial functions, such as cleansing water of
pollutants, controlling floods, and contributing to groundwater
supplies, isolated wetlands have a substantial impact on interstate
commerce. 2 8 In addition, the ecological connections of isolated
wetlands to other wetlands and bodies of water substantially affect
interstate commerce by contributing to biological diversity and
supporting populations of endangered species and migratory
supplying water for livestock and moisturizing soil, which increases crop production and forage
for livestock). Regulation of isolated bodies of water that contribute to crops sold in interstate
commerce has been upheld. See Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799, 803 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding
that commerce power extends to lake located entirely within state when lake was "used to
irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce").
213. A case study in Florida showed that isolated wetlands incorporated into a storm water
runoff discharge system were capable of reducing suspended solids by 66%, lead by 73%, zinc
by 56%, nitrogen by 21%, organic nitrogen by 23%, ammonia by 54%, and phosphorus by 17%.
See McArthur, supra note 209, at 189.
214. See Kusler et al., supra note 182, at 68 (describing how bacteria associated with wetlands
cleanse waters by transforming pollutants found in water into harmless gases).
215. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 72, at 155 (listing prairie potholes as type
of isolated wetland).
216. See WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, supra note 46, at 6 (explaining that plants found in prairie
pothole ecosystem absorb nitrogen into their tissue which is, in turn, absorbed by soil). The
role isolated wetlands play in absorbing nitrogen is particularly important in light of estimates
that "37 percent of the counties in the United States have nitrate contamination due to
agricultural activities." Id.
217. "Wetlands are part of our Nation's waters and their protection is important to achieving
the National goals, set forth in the GWA, of maintaining and restoring the physical, biological
and chemical integrity of our Nation's waters." Regulatory Reform Act Hearings/EPA Testimony,
supra note 81 (statement of Robert Perciasepe, Assistant Adm'r of EPA) (insisting that wetlands
must be included as waters covered by Clean Water Act because their functions are important
in achieving goals set forth by Act); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994) (stating that purpose of
Clean Water Act is "[t] o restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation's waters").
218. See Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir.
1994) (concluding that groundwaters are not covered by Clean Water Act). But see Quivira
Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 130 (finding that subsurface waters can be regulated by Clean
WaterAct). Replacing the functions that wetlands naturally provide with water treatment plants,
drainage ditches, sewer systems, and dams would be extremely costly thereby affecting interstate
commerce. See supra notes 198-217 and accompanying text.
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birds. 19 Although the filling of isolated wetlands may be an intra-
state activity, the repercussions of destroying isolated wetlands are not
confined to state lines.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Whether an isolated wetland is subject to federal regulation
depends on whether the wetland has a substantial connection to
interstate commerce. Currently, the Corps and most courts recognize
that the presence of migratory birds connects isolated wetlands to
interstate commerce. Aside from serving as migratory bird habitat,
isolated wetlands can help to improve water quality, to reduce
flooding, and to promote biological diversity. These functions also
should be recognized as substantial connections to interstate
commerce.
Unfortunately, the functions of isolated wetlands often are
misunderstood. A Seventh Circuit case concerning federal regulation
of isolated wetlands illustrates this point.22 ° The court, in an
opinion written by Judge Manion, stated that the "protection of
[isolated wetlands] would not further the stated policy of the [Clean
Water] Act 'to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters."'221 On the contrary, as
a recent scientific study concluded, isolated wetlands perform many
of the same functions as other wetlands, including playing an
important role in maintaining water quality.222
Therefore, when drafting and interpreting environmental protec-
tion laws, it is imperative that scientific principles be considered if the
policy is to be effective. This is particularly important with regard
to the Clean Water Act, which seeks to preserve the "biological
integrity of the Nation's waters."224 Biological integrity "refers to a
system's wholeness, including the presence of all appropriate elements
219. See supra notes 186-97 and accompanying text.
220. SeeHoffman Homes, Inc., v. EPA, 961 F.2d 1310, 1322 (7th Cir. 1992), vacated, 999 F.2d
256 (7th Cir. 1993). The Hoffman I court found that the EPA did not have the authority to
regulate isolated wetlands. See 961 F.2d at 1316. The Hoffman ! court upheld the authority of
the EPA and the Corps to regulate isolated wetlands. See 999 F.2d at 261.
221. 961 F.2d at 1322 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)).
222. See NATIONAL RESEARcH CouNciL, supra note 72, at 156.
223. See generally Paul L. Angermeier & James P, Karr, Biological Integrity Versus Biological
Diversity as Policy Directives: ProtectingBotic Resources, 44 BIOScIENcE 690 (1994), available in 1994
WL 13106248 (advocating use of concepts of biological integrity and biological diversity when
devising environmental policy).
224. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
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* and occurrence of all processes at appropriate rates."2" Maintain-
ing the "biological integrity" of our nation's waters cannot be accom-
plished without considering scientific evidence of the ecological
functions of isolated wetlands and their connections to neighboring
ecosystems. 26 In short, even "isolated" wetlands should not be
viewed in isolation.
Courts should apply this "ecosystem" concept when determining
whether an activity affecting the environment has a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.227 With respect to the regulation of
isolated wetlands, courts also should consider the cumulative effect of
destroying isolated wetlands. Accordingly, courts should incorporate
ecological principles and scientific evidence into their factual analysis
of whether particular isolated wetlands substantially affect interstate
commerce.
CONCLUSION
The future regulation and protection of isolated wetlands depends
on the actions of courts, Congress, and agencies such as the EPA and
the Corps. All three governmental branches should make an effort
to ground their decisions on scientifically sound data. As the National
Research Council noted in its study on wetlands, "The scientific basis
for policies that attribute less importance to headwater areas and
isolated wetlands than to other wetlands is weak." 2 Accordingly,
scientific evidence that isolated wetlands provide habitat for migratory
birds, promote biological diversity, control flooding, improve water
quality, and recharge groundwater supplies supports the conclusion
that the destruction of isolated wetlands substantially affects interstate
commerce.
225. Angermeier & Karr, supra note 223. The House Committee Report defined "integrity"
as "a condition in which the natural structure and function of ecosystems is maintained." H.
Rep. No. 92-911, at 76 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.CALN. 3776, 3778.
226. See Angermeier & Karr, supra note 223 ("[B]iological systems are not strictly
deterministic but may develop (i.e. be organized) along multiple pathways as a result of different
initial conditions, conditions in neighboring systems, and the sequence of influential events.").
227. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 72, at 59. The National Research Council
notes:
The ecosystem concept, which is now being invoked widely in the management and
regulation of environmental resources, acknowledges the integration of physical,
chemical, and biological phenomena in the environment. Attempts to regulate,
manage, protect, restore, or even identify wetlands without recognition of this
underlying principle are likely to be ineffective.
Id.
228. Id. at 156.
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